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NOTES
FLORIDA'S STANDING TRAIN DOCTRINE: A TRANSITION
Mr. Justice Holmes once expressed the philosophy that when a
standard of conduct is clearly needed "it should be laid down once
for all by the Courts."' Under this philosophy courts established
rigid rules of law defining certain standards of conduct for judicial
application, and a subsequent plaintiff falling below the defined
standard of conduct would be barred from recovery irrespective of
the degree of his negligence or the extraordinary circumstances of
his case. Such was the status of the doctrine applicable to standing
train-motor vehicle accidents in Florida prior to 1951. Since that
time this doctrine has undergone a transition. The purpose of this
note is to trace that transition and to ascertain the current status of the
law.
CHANGES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In 1877 the Florida Legislature attempted to alleviate the harshness of the rule of contributory negligence in accidents involving rail2
roads by providing:
"A railroad company shall be liable for any damage done ...
by the running of the locomotives, or cars.., unless the company
shall make it appear that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the presumption
in all cases being against the company."
This presumption arises by allegation and proof that the plaintiff
was injured, that the injury was caused by the defendant railroad,
and that as a result of the injury damages were sustained. 3 If, however, any material evidence is offered by the railroad tending to show
reasonable care the presumption vanishes.4 The latter interpretation
'Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
2FLA. STAT. §768.05 (1953).
3Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Watkins, 97 Fla. 350, 121 So. 95 (1929); Seaboard AL.
Ry. v. Myrick, 91 Fla. 918, 109 So. 193 (1926).
'E.g., Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Price, 46 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1950); Powell v. American

[311]
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of the statute is essential to prevent a violation of due process under
the United States Constitution.5 In fact, the Florida Supreme Court
has held that after evidence of care is offered it is prejudicial error
if the court makes any reference to the presumption in the charge
to the jury. 6
The word "running" has previously been interpreted to include
only physical movement or action on the part of the locomotives or
cars and not the general operation of the railroad; 7 therefore no
presumption of negligence resulted from a collision involving a
standing train.s This view appeared to be qualified when the Florida
Court held in Brown v. Loftin9 that whether moving or stationary
"the train was being operated within the meaning of the statute."
The facts, however, showed that the automobile collided with the
seventeenth car of a moving freight train, which made dictum of the
Court's statement concerning stationary trains; the presumption of
negligence statute had always been applied to accidents involving
moving trains.
The Florida Court has recently reconsidered the problem in Horton v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.,1° in which the plaintiff's son
drove underneath defendant's freight train while riding on a motor
scooter late at night. At the time of the collision the train was stationary; but immediately thereafter the train began moving, dragging
the plaintiff's son to his death. Without characterizing the train as
moving or stationary at the time of the injury, the Court held that the
presumption of negligence statute applied, stating that stopping,
starting, running, and leaving the train standing on the grade crossing
are acts of the railroad employees done in the "running or operation"
Sumatra Tob. Co., 154 Fla. 227, 17 So.2d 391 (1944); Roberts v. Powell, 137 Fla.
159, 187 So. 766 (1939); Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Voss, 136 Fla. 32, 186 So. 199 (1939).
5Stringfellow v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 290 U.S. 322 (1933), avoiding the rule of
Western & A. Ry. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929); see Legis., 2 U. OF FLA. L. REV.
124, 126 (1949).
6Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. Bailey, 190 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1951); Powell v. American
Sumatra Tob. Co., supra note 4; Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Voss, supra note 4.
7E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Soule, 84 Fla. 557, 94 So. 692 (1922); Atlantic C.
R.R. v. McCormick, 59 Fla. 121, 52 So. 712 (1910).
sGood v. Atlantic CL. R.R., 142 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1944); Martin v. Kenan, 145
Fla. 488, 199 So. 919 (1941); Clark v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 141 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621
(1939); Cline v. Fowell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939); Rayam v. Atlantic CL.
R.R., 119 Fla. 386, 161 So. 415 (1935).
9154 Fla. 621, 18 So.2d 540 (1944).
1061 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1952).
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of the train."' This decision has apparently extended the scope of
the word "running" to include "operation of trains." Under this
interpretation it is immaterial whether the train is moving or stationary at the time of the collision.
In addition to the presumption of negligence statute the Florida
2
Legislature provided further:'
"If the plaintiff and the agents of the [railroad] company are
both at fault, the former may recover, but the amount of recovery shall be such a proportion of the entire damages sustained, as the defendant's negligence bears to the combined
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant."
This statute permitting recovery by the negligent plaintiff has been
construed as applicable only concurrently with the presumption of
negligence statute.' 3 Therefore, although the wording of the comparative negligence statute does not specifically limit recovery to accidents involving the "running" of the train, this result has been
reached by the concurrent application of this statute with the presumption of negligence statute.' 4 Thus the Horton case apparently
extended both statutes to include all accidents involving the operation
of trains, stationary or moving. This position is supported by the
very recent decision of Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Johnston.5
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDING TRAIN DoCRINE

Closely associated with, but distinguishable from, the two statutes
is the standing train doctrine: In a collision with a standing train the
mere presence of the train upon a crossing gives sufficient notice to
make the plaintiff's act of running into the train the sole proximate
211d. at 411.
'2FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1953).
"3Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Webb, 112 FIa. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933); see Legis., 2
U. oF FLA. L. REv. 124, 125 (1949). The acts were passed simultaneously and have
always been considered as one act regulating a single restricted subject matter.
14Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. Webb, supra note 13; Florida E.C. Ry. v. Johnson, 70 Fla.
422, 70 So. 397 (1915); Seaboard AJ,. Ry. v. Rentz, 60 Fla. 449, 54 So. 20 (1910);
Atlantic C.L. R.R. v. McCormick, supra note 7.
1574 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1954). Although the Court did not mention the application
of the presumption of negligence statute, inspection of appellee's brief (pp. 6, 7)
reveals that the statue did apply and that the question was argued as to whether
the evidence presented by the railroad met the rebuttable presumption.
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cause of the accident.' 6 Under this doctrine the railroad has a right
to assume that motorists will drive at such a rate of speed as will
enable them to see the train in time to prevent a collision.'7 This
reasoning evolved in Stowers v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.18 and subsequent Florida cases' 9 as an analogy to Key West Electric Co. v.
Albury. 20 In Key West Electric the defendant trolley company left
several rails alongside the street at night, unguarded and without
flares, over which the plaintiff tripped. The Florida Court held that
through the exercise of ordinary care the existence of the rails would
have been discovered and the accident would not have resulted; thus
there was no causal connection between the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiff's injury.
Most courts have qualified the doctrine to allow recovery if the
company fails to take reasonable precautions when conditions at the
crossing are usually hazardous.21 In the past the Florida Court
has extended the doctrine, denying recovery even when a dark and
foggy atmosphere made visibility poor 22 or when the incline of the
road prevented the car lights from revealing the train. 23 In these
cases the Court reasoned that "the train remaining stationary on the
crossing, ipso facto, could not be the proximate cause of the injury." 24
Also the doctrine has been held to include moving trains when the
collision took place after the train had occupied the crossing for
'sEg., Good v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., supra note 8; Smith v. Brumley, 88 F.2d 803
(10th Cir. 1937); Clark v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 141 Fla. 155, 192 So. 621 (1939);
Kimball v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 132 Fla. 235, 181 So. 533 (1939); Bowen v. Great N.

R.R., 65 N.D. 384, 259 N.W. 99 (1935). Contra: Hendrickson v. Union Pac. R.R.,
17 Wash.2d 548, 136 P.2d 438 (1943).
'7Thompson v. Stevens, 106 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1939); Megan v. Stevens, 91 F.2d
419 (8th Cir. 1937); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 31 Del. 247, 114 At. 62 (1921);
Clark v. Atlantic CJ. R.R., supra note 16.
:8106 Fla. 102, 142 So. 882 (1932).
19Clark v. Atlantic Ci. R.R., supra note 16; Kimball v. Atlantic C.L. R.R.
supra note 16.
2091 Fla. 695, 109 So. 223 (1926).
21E.g., Flagg v. Chicago, G.W. R.R., 143 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1944); Norfolk Sou. R.R.
v. Swindell, 139 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1943); Holt v. Thompson, 115 F.2d 1013 (10th
Cir. 1940); Crapse v. Southern Ry., 201 S.C. 176, 21 S.E.2d 737 (1942); see Note
161 A.L.R. 111 (1946).
22Clne v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939); Clark v. Atlantic C.L. R.R.,
supra note 16; Kimball v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., infra note 24.
23Bray v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 153 Fla. 619, 15 So.2d 417 (1943); Kimball v.
Atlantic C.L. R.R., infra note 24.
24Kimball v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 132 Fla. 235, 181 So. 533 (1938).
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a considerable time2 5 but not to include a simultaneous approach
when the train occupied the intersection only a few seconds before
26
the accident.
This established doctrine, together with the presumption of negligence statute, was re-examined in the Horton case. After holding that,
moving or stationary, the "operation" of the train raised a presumption
of negligence, the Court refused to hold as a matter of law that the
sole proximate cause of the collision was the act of the plaintiff's son
in running into the side of the train. Instead the Court stated that
the standing train doctrine should not be indiscriminately applied in
every collision involving standing trains. Indiscriminate application,
it pointed out, impinges upon the provisions of the presumption of
negligence and comparative negligence statutes.
27
The federal case of Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. v. Church
contains a recent construction of Florida's position. Testimony showed
that 28
"... the road was not straight but curving, that there was a
dip in the roadway, that the headlights did not light up the
train until the car came out of the dip, and that [the] pavement and standing cars were black and unlighted."
The standing train doctrine was held not applicable under these
conditions. The court stated that the special circumstances surrounding the accident and the stopping and standing of the train were sufficient grounds for the jury to find negligence, thus preventing a
directed verdict under the orthodox doctrine. This view has been
accepted by the Florida Court in its most recent interpretation of the
Florida position. 29 This qualification of the doctrine is indicative of
the present tendency to reject rigid rules of law in favor of concepts
that enhance the plaintiff's opportunity to recover damages30
2fOuzts v. PoweUl, 125 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1942); Brown v. Loftin, 154 Fla. 621,
18 So.2d 540 (1944); Chassereau v. Powell, 116 Fla. 586, 156 So. 721 (1934).

2t3Goff v. Atlantic C.L. R.PL, 53 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1951).
F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1954).
281d. at 690.
27212

2oAtlantic C.L. R.R. v. Johnston, 74 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1954).
2OSee PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTs 284-287 (1941); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549
(1948); 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 443 (1949).
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LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCrRINE '

A concept that ordinarily favors the plaintiff is the last dear chance
doctrine: "The party who last has a dear opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for it."32 This doctrine's rationale characterizes the defendant's intervening negligence as the sole proximate
cause of the injury, relegating the plaintiff's antecedent negligence
33
to a remote cause; thus the plaintiff's bar to recovery vanishes.
The last dear chance doctrine was applied to a standing train accident in Poindexterv. Seaboard Air Line Ry.34 The plaintiff motorist ran into defendant's standing train, which was parked upon a highway crossing. Eight lights were burning in the locomotive cab, and
appropriate warning signs were visible along the highway approaching
the crossing. The engineer continuously observed the plaintiff's car,
traveling fifty to sixty miles an hour down a 1600-foot stretch of unobstructed highway. When the car came within 400 to 500 feet of
the locomotive the engineer, according to his testimony, blew the train
whistle. Other testimony, however, indicated that the whistle was
blown only seconds before the collision. The trial court instructed
the jury on the last dear chance doctrine. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the court set it aside and granted a new trial.
Upon appeal the Florida Supreme Court reversed the order for new
trial, holding that the instruction as to the last dear chance doctrine
was proper and that its application was a jury question.
The Court reasoned that the jury could find that the engineer
should have realized the plaintiff's peril and blown the whistle in
time to avoid the collision. This reasoning has been followed by
other jurisdictions in similar factual situations. 3s Some courts, however, have refused to hold the railroad liable under the doctrine.30
siFor fundamentals of the doctrine see PRosszR, op. cit. supra note 30 at 408-416;
Steinhardt and Simon, Florida's Last Clear Chance Doctrine, 7 MrAmr L.Q. 457
(1953); 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 300 (1948).
32Merchants Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401, 403 (1938).
33Merchants Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 149 So. 401 (1933).
3456 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951).
15E.g., Underwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 205 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1953); Ziekefoose
v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S.W.2d 784 (1941) (Missouri humanitarian doctrine).
36E.g., Johnson v. Sacramento N. Ry., 54 Cal. App.2d 528, 129 P.2d 503 (1942)
(train moving very slowly over highway crossing); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Switzer,
275 Ky. 834, 122 S.W.2d 967 (1938); cf. Sympson v. Southern Ry., 279 Ky. 619, 131
S.W.2d 481 (1939) (railway employees not at scene of accident); see Atlantic C.L.
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In Johnson v. Sacramento Northern Ry. 37 the court held that there
is no reason for an engineer to assume that the motorist in a rapidly
approaching vehicle is inattentive or in peril until the motorist's car
reaches a position where it cannot be stopped in time to avoid a collision. Thereafter, stated the court, the time remaining would be too
short for the engineer to have a last dear chance. The doctrine "implies thought, appreciation, mental direction, and lapse of sufficient
time to effectually act . . .,,3
The Court in the Poindexter case refused to apply the standing
train doctrine.39 Thus the entire loss from the accident shifted to
the defendant by the application of the last clear chance doctrine,
even though both parties contributed to the cause of the accident.
Writers have pointed out that the only real explanation for this
anomalous situation is the courts' dislike of the contributory negli40
gence rule.
One writer states that the last clear chance doctrine is a road
leading to the apportionment of damages. 41 This might be true in the
case of standing train-motor vehicle accidents in Florida. In the Horton
case the Florida Court implied that the standing train in the Poindexter case- which was in the midst of switching operations at the
time of the accident - came within the meaning of the word "running"
in Florida's presumption of negligence statute. If the Court meant
this, the comparative negligence statute should have been applied in
42
the Poindextercase.
This raises the question of whether the last clear chance doctrine
should be applied in a situation covered by the comparative negligence
statute. One court has indicated that the last dear chance doctrine
is superseded by comparative negligence statutes when they are applicable. 43 The doctrine, however, can still apply under the comR.R. v. Dolan, 84 Ga. App. 734, 67 S.E.2d 243 (1951) (motorist held solely liable

under Georgia comparative negligence statute).
3754 Cal. App.2d 528, 129 P.2d 503 (1942).
a8Merchants Transp. Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 504, 149 So. 401, 404 (1,933)
39The Court refused to apply Kimball v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 132 Fla. 235, 181
So. 533 (1939), and similar cases because these cases completely ignored the last
clear
chance doctrine.
4
OPRossER, op. cit. supra note 30, at 410; Steinhardt and Simon, supra note 31.
41James, Last Clear Chance, A TransitionalDoctrine, 47 YALE Lj.704 (1938).
42Since the train was motionless, plaintiff's lawyers probably thought that

Florida's presumption of negligence and comparative negligence statutes were inapplicable. See discussion at p. 317 supra.
43Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 490, 49 S.E.2d 90, 107 (1948).
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parative negligence statutes if the defendant's supervening negligence
is characterized as the sole proximate cause of the accident.4 Florida
adheres to this view when the evidence so warrants.
Even though the latter view is logical, there are considerations
that make the rejection of the last clear chance doctrine desirable
when the comparative negligence statute applies. B The apparent
intent of the statute is to apportion damages between parties contributing to an accident rather than to place the entire loss on one
person.47 While the last clear chance doctrine evolved to relieve the
same evil, its outdated rationale- produces a result contrary to the
intent of the statute. One writer states the case succinctly:49
"... . the real objection to the last dear chance is that it seeks

to alleviate the hardships of contributory negligence by shifting
the entire loss due to the fault of both parties from the plaintiff to the defendant. It is still no more reasonable to charge
the defendant with the plaintiff's share of the consequences
of his fault than to charge the plaintiff with the defendant's; and
it is no better policy to relieve the negligent plaintiff of all
responsibility for his injury than it is to relieve the negligent
defendant."
If the comparative negligence statute had been applied in the Poindexter case on the ground that the negligence of both parties was
concurrent up to the time of the collision a more realistic and equitable result would have followed. 50
In summarizing, although the standing train doctrine is still
recognized, the Florida Court has taken the position that it should
not be indiscriminately applied in every collision involving standing
trains. Instead, when the testimony indicates special circumstances
courts may allow the jury to determine the question of negligence.
If both parties are found to be negligent the comparative negligence
statute may logically apply, since the presumption of negligence statute
44Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. v. Adams, 187 Ark. 816, 62 S.W.2d 947 (1933).
45Seaboard A.L. Ry. v. Martin, 56 So.2d 509, 510 (Fla. 1952).
46GRgoRy, LEGisLATivE Loss DISTRIBIUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcrIONS 126-134 (1936).
47See discussion in CHANGES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION supra.
4sHilkey, The Last Clear Chance in Florida and Georgia, A Comparison, 28
F. BJ. 24 (1954).
9

4 PRossER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS

14 (1953).

5OSee note 42 supra.
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